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Institutional Analysis of Legal Change: The Case of 
Corporate Governance in China 
Sonja Opper∗  
Sylvia Schwaag-Serger∗∗  
During the last three decades, China has undergone a period of 
unprecedented institutional change. The gradual market transition of 
the economy and China’s integration into the WTO have created a 
strong demand for new laws and regulations. For institutional 
economics this period provides a unique opportunity to study the 
qualities, implications, and driving forces of distinct legal 
arrangements and their impact on economic development in transition 
economies. Empirical research not only provides insight into China’s 
emerging legal system, it also promises important feedback effects 
for the field of institutional economics. In this paper we argue that 
meaningful analysis of legal change in transition economies, such as 
China’s, must look beyond change of law in the books; it requires 
analysis of institutional frameworks that shape social behavior, which 
in turn explain the effectiveness of changes in the law. Using the 
example of corporate governance, we show that changes in the law 
have not sufficiently been matched by changes in institutional 
conditions, explaining why, in spite of far-reaching judicial reform, 
Chinese corporate governance still displays significant weaknesses in 
practice.  
INTRODUCTION 
Transition economies are characterized by far-reaching 
transformations, and often sudden changes, in their given institutional 
settings, which are not normally observable in advanced market 
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economies. With rapidly progressing lawmaking processes, transition 
economies naturally emerge as one of the main field laboratories for 
studying legal change. Compared to the early twenty-first century, 
virtually no other period in economic history provides such a high 
concentration of law-making, such an encompassing breadth of new 
formal institutions, and such a variety of distinct approaches to 
implement new formal rules.  
This has opened a rare window of opportunity for empirical 
research. The majority of legal research typically focuses on the 
quality of new formal norms, but quality assessments are often 
derived by cross-national and “best practice”-comparisons. For 
transition economies, however, experience shows that a one-sided 
focus on legal norms may not be fruitful. Many initially celebrated 
laws turn out to be ineffective and in need of further revision. An 
example frequently referred to is the much applauded international 
harmonization of China’s Intellectual Property Rights Law. Within 
only 20 years, China went from having no legal protection of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) to setting up a comprehensive legal 
framework for IPR protection that is largely in conformity with 
international standards and practices.1 Nonetheless, IPR 
infringements remain serious in China. As an example, according to a 
recent study by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) assessing 
software piracy, China’s software piracy rate, measured as the 
percentage of total software installed that was not legally acquired, 
was 86% in 2005, generating losses of 3.8 billion U.S. dollars.2 
We maintain that for transition economies, a one-sided focus on 
“law in the books” has an inherent tendency to overrate the quality of 
legality and the degree of international harmonization. Transition 
economies are typically characterized by weak traditions of private 
property rights, weak judiciaries, and behavioral patterns shaped by 
decades of socialist planning. Therefore, transplants of ideal-type 
laws, which operate successfully in western market economies, will 
 
 1. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (2005) [hereinafter OECD]; Deli Yang, The Development of 
Intellectual Property in China, 25 WORLD PATENT INFORMATION 131 (2003). 
 2. See Third Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study, 2006 BUS. SOFTWARE 
ALLIANCE AND IDC GLOBAL SOFTWARE 4–8. 
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not exert similar effects in the transition context.3 Similarly, a one-
sided focus on informal constraints would not help to understand 
economic behavior in transition economies.  
Comprehensive institutional analysis that attempts to combine 
formal and informal norms offers a more reliable approach for 
capturing the complexities of legal change. Rule enforcement 
depends not only on the existence and quality of norms and state 
power; it is the “mixture of informal norms, rules, and enforcement 
characteristics together [that] defines the choice set and results in 
outcomes.”4 The focal interest is thus to understand and explore the 
institutions that actually shape and influence social behavior. Legal 
rules which are not enforced and do not influence individual behavior 
are, in this line of thought, not even regarded as part of an 
institution.5  
The case of corporate governance reforms provides a useful 
illustration of this analytical framework. In essence, the shift to 
Western-style corporate governance mechanisms implies that 
centralized and highly politicized command structures based on 
central planning are replaced by decentralized organizational 
structures and external market signals, which help to balance inherent 
agency problems associated with a separation of ownership and 
control.6 Legal research on emerging corporate governance systems 
in transition economies primarily focuses on the quality of new 
formal norms as specified in Corporate Law and Securities Law. In 
spite of careful studies of international best-practice in drafting these 
laws, one of the major lessons was that corporate governance would 
not automatically develop as a natural response to comprehensive 
privatization programs and shifts in formal control rights. Instead, 
privatization and the implementation of national corporate 
governance systems are actually two separate tasks of institution 
 
 3. Katharina Pistor et al., Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons 
from Six Countries, 18 THE WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 89 (2003); Troy Paredes, Corporate 
Governance and Economic Development, 28 REGULATION 34–39 (Spring 2005). 
 4. Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97 (1990). 
 5. AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY, LESSONS 
FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
 6. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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building. Neglect of the specific needs for appropriate internal and 
external governance mechanisms inevitably undermines the 
effectiveness of privatization programs. The widespread phenomenon 
of insider control in Russia, for instance, has been mainly attributed 
to deficient corporate governance mechanisms.7 
This suggests complementing the analysis of new formal norms 
with a broader framework of corresponding institutional elements. In 
his Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy, Greif’s 
definition of an institution as a “system of rules, beliefs, norms, and 
organizations that together generate a system of (social) behavior” 
provides a useful starting point.8 In this sense, legal rules per se are 
only one institutional element, while the quality of corporate 
governance as an institution is jointly determined by a complex 
system of complementary and interacting elements. When it comes to 
the institutional analysis of legal change, this complexity underlines 
the need to explicitly incorporate the interplay between distinct 
institutional elements that combine to form the broader system of 
corporate governance. Incompatibilities between new corporate laws 
and persisting informal norms may not only undermine the 
effectiveness of newly instituted formal norms; they can also give 
rise to informal opposition norms if preferences of stakeholders in an 
organization are in conflict with newly implemented formal norms.9 
Also, interactions with complementary institutional elements deserve 
close analysis.  
The weak correlation between formal shareholder rights 
protection and the development of financial markets in transition 
economies supports the view that law on the books has only limited 
 
 7. Masahshiko Aoki, Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in 
Transition Economies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: INSIDER 
CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF BANKS 3–30 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., The World 
Bank 1995). Aoki ascribes negative performance effects of insider control in Russian firms to 
the fact that the Western paradigm of diffuse ownership was applied blindly. While potential 
principle-agent problems arising from small ownership concentration and widespread 
shareholdings are mitigated by efficient capital markets, the market for corporate governance, 
and the market for managers in Western market economies, such corporate governance 
mechanisms do not yet exist in transition economies. The malfeasance of agents in transitory 
firms is therefore hidden by an institutional vacuum, which allows the emergence of 
opportunistic behavior and insider control. Id. 
 8. GREIF, supra note 5. 
 9. Victor Nee, Organisational Dynamics of Market Transition, ADMIN. SCI. Q. (1992). 
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explanatory power if corresponding institutional elements are 
missing.10 Newly emerging corporate governance systems therefore 
provide interesting cases to explore the operation of newly codified 
formal rules in a broader institutional framework, incorporating 
institutions of law enforcement, informal norms, and corresponding 
institutional elements.  
Due to distinct contextual features, legal change in China may 
provide one of the most informative cases for analysis. Several 
features stand out. Most importantly, China is one of the few 
transition economies where market transition is not preceded or 
accompanied by political democratization, but rather orchestrated by 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).11 Due to the uncontested 
monopoly power of the CCP, one therefore would expect distinct 
trajectories of institutional change, which mainly serve the interests 
of the old political elite. Closely tied to the one-party rule of the CCP, 
China lacks an independent judiciary, one of the foremost 
preconditions for safeguarding property rights, and enabling growth 
and development.  
Second, due to the distinct timing and sequencing of reforms, 
China’s transition period can serve as a classical example of gradual 
and evolutionary institutional change.12 When China’s “open door 
policy” was initiated in 1978, an overall reform strategy was missing 
and the eventual reform goal was not clearly defined. Instead it took 
another fifteen years of ideological debate until the central leadership 
agreed to institute a socialist market economic system.13 Furthermore, 
in contrast with Russia, China’s reforms remained largely 
independent from international policy advisors. More recently, 
China’s WTO accession in 200114 has exerted increasing external 
pressure upon the Chinese leadership to speed up legal harmonization 
 
 10. Pistor et al., supra note 3. 
 11. Phillip Keefer & Stephen Kanck, Why Don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-
National Test of Institutional Environment, 35 ECON. INQUIRY 590 (1997). 
 12. Peter Murrell, The Transition According to Cambridge, Mass., 33 J. ECON. LIT. 164 
(1995). 
 13. Shangquan Gao, Taking a Market-Oriented Direction and Pushing Forward in a 
Gradual Way: The Basic Experience of China’s Economic Reform, 4(2) CHINA ECON. REV. 129 
(1993). 
 14. Gregory C. Chow, Impact of Joining the WTO on China’s Economic, Legal and 
Political Institutions, 8(2) PAC. ECON. REV. 105 (2003).  
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of domestic laws in line with international standards and improved 
law enforcement. Overall, institutional change in China has mainly 
been determined by the interplay between changing political 
priorities at the central government level and a shifting power balance 
between the old political elite and new economic agents.  
In the following section, we highlight the complexities of China’s 
corporate governance reforms in order to support our claim that 
institutional analysis of legal change needs to go beyond the analysis 
of legal norms. The remainder of the paper will first focus on the 
political economy of corporate governance reforms, and then shift to 
institutional complementarities and enforcement issues. The final 
section will conclude and call for further research. 
I. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORPORATE LAW REFORMS 
Politics is a major force shaping the structure of national corporate 
governance systems.15 In transition economies, the role of political 
interests is even more pronounced. While the development of joint-
stock companies and corresponding corporate governance systems in 
the Western industrialized nations relied on endogenous evolutionary 
processes based on free exchange of property rights and profit 
making objectives, new corporate governance structures in transition 
economies were created in top-down approaches.16 This involved the 
(partial) replacement of established political governance structures 
reaching into the firm and a fundamental shift of control rights from 
political actors to private economic actors.  
Such reallocation of control rights is likely to meet opposition by 
stakeholder groups who seek to defend their vested interests. On one 
hand, state actors defend their direct control rights and rent-seeking 
opportunities at the firm level as privatization of control rights would 
deprive them of a convenient instrument to influence local welfare 
and development (e.g. local employment, health, structural change 
 
 15. NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL (1990); Neil 
Fligstein & Robert Freeland, Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Corporate 
Organization, 21 ANN. REV. SOC. 21 (1995); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK 
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
 16. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 301 (1983). 
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etc).17 Also, a redistribution of control rights to private economic 
actors would limit chances for rent-seeking behavior and other forms 
of private enrichment.18 Political opposition against purely market-
based corporate governance is therefore likely. On the other hand, 
managers welcome the continuation of direct state-firm linkages to 
secure preferential access to resources in a highly insecure and 
rapidly changing institutional environment. This atmosphere of close 
and continuing state-firm relations gives rise to a new, hybrid 
economic order of “politicized capitalism” where state actors tend to 
remain directly involved in guiding transactions at the firm level.19 
Although the newly instituted formal rules impose certain limits on 
state interventions in the firm, the system lacks clearly defined state-
firm boundaries.20  
It fits well into the overall picture of politicized capitalism that the 
Chinese government rejected a complete privatization of the ailing 
state-owned sector. Instead, large State Owned Entities (SOEs) were 
corporatized, and partly privatized while the government maintained 
controlling shares.21 The goal was to raise equity capital without 
losing state firms as convenient policy tools to influence urban 
employment levels, and to steer and direct the development and 
growth of sensitive industries.22 Partial privatization and maintenance 
of controlling state shares allowed the state to control a growing pool 
of assets with a fixed pool of equity.  
 
 17. Akos Rona-Tas, The First Shall Be the Last? Entrepreneurship and the Communist 
Cadres in the Transition from Socialism, 100 AM. J. SOC. 40 (1994); Yanjie Bian & John R. 
Logan, Market Transition and the Persistence of Power: The Changing Stratification System in 
Urban China, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 739 (1996); William L. Parish & Ethan Michelson, Politics 
and Markets: Dual Transformations, 101 AM. J. SOC. 1042 (1996); Xueguang Zhou, Economic 
Transition and Income Inequity in Urban China: Evidence from a Panel Data, 105 AM. J. SOC. 
1135 (2000). 
 18. Shleifer, Andrei & Robert Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q.J. ECON. 995, 1019 
(Nov. 1994). 
 19. Victor Nee & Sonja Opper, On Politicized Capitalism, in ON CAPITALISM 93 (Victor 
Nee & Richard Swedberg eds., 2007). 
 20. Victor Nee, Organisational Dynamics of Market Transition, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1 
(1992). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA ECON. 
REV. 494 (2003).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A key element to secure persisting and unchallenged state-control 
was the establishment of a segmented stock market operating with 
different share-types and distinct trading rules. While shares held by 
the state (state-shares) and “legal person”23 are only transferable upon 
state approval, the domestic market of freely traded shares is limited 
to so-called A-shares and B-shares, which on average cover one-third 
of the total company stocks.24 Share trading across different share 
types is prohibited; a stable ownership distribution between the state, 
legal persons, and individual shareholders is thereby guaranteed.25 
These features reveal that the government was not ready to lose direct 
ownership control over the public production sector but still sought to 
embed stock listings within the framework of socialist ownership. 
Stock market listings were, primarily, convenient tools to raise fresh 
capital.  
This general motivation has strongly influenced China’s newly 
instituted corporate governance system. Particularly, China’s first 
Company Law (effective in 1994) reflects the government’s intent to 
provide a legal framework to modernize the state-owned sector 
without giving up the socialist principle of public ownership and state 
control.26 The provision of incentives for business development and 
private firm growth was not prioritized. In this sense, the Company 
Law in its original form displays a restrictive and suppressive 
character,27 signaling a historically deep-rooted skepticism toward 
any form of privately generated wealth not controlled by the state 
bureaucracy.28  
Formally, the Company Law specifies a hybrid corporate 
governance system, mainly modeled on the Anglo-U.S. system and 
complemented with elements borrowed from the German two-tiered 
 
 23. Legal person shares are typically held by state or non-state firms and organizations 
registered as legal persons. 
 24. Sonja Opper, Going Public without the Public: Between Political Governance and 
Corporate Governance, in THE CHINESE ECONOMY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ENTERPRISE AND 
BUSINESS BEHAVIOUR 6 (Barbara Krug & Hans Hendrischke eds., 2007).  
 25. SONJA OPPER, ZWISCHEN POLITICAL GOVERNANCE UND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
80–85 (2004). 
 26. Company Law (1994) art. 1 (P.R.C.). 
 27. Clarke, supra note 22, at 494–507. 
 28. William Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enterprise in 
Twentieth Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43 (1995).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/11
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board system and components of the Japanese main-bank system.29 
The eclectic mix of institutional elements, all successful in their 
respective institutional environments of origin, led to the creation of 
an organizational hybrid, which turns out to be particularly weak in 
exerting effective corporate controls, either market based or 
stakeholder-based. To further illustrate how general policy priorities 
shaped the Company Law and laid the foundations of a distinct, 
essentially patrimonial corporate governance system, the following 
section highlights two key areas of organizational reforms: the newly 
established vertical command structures within the firm and the 
extent of private shareholder protection. 
A. Vertical Command Structures 
While China’s Company Law seeks to institute vertical command 
structures (including CEOs, boards of directors, and supervisory 
committees) resembling Western-style systems of organizational 
control, political control structures reaching into the firm have not 
been fully dissolved. The official policy-line was a separation of 
government and business,30 but formal rules reveal a certain degree of 
ambivalence and inconsistency. According to the official policy line, 
the state’s role was supposed to be constrained to that of a normal 
shareholder without any priority rights.31 In spite of these statements, 
the Company Law revealed a more ambivalent position toward firm 
 
 29. ON KIT TAM, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA (1999); 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTIONS PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2007 (Sept. 26, 2007), 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2007/cpi2007 [hereinafter CPI 2007]. 
 30. This concept, referred to as “zhengqi fenkai,” was mentioned in Gufenzhi qiye shidian 
banfa, in ZHONGGUO RENMIN ch. 1, ln. 1, (Daxue Jinrong yu Zhengquan Yanjiusuo ed., 2000).  
 31. In this sense, it has been postulated that:  
The government performs the functions of shareholder in the state-financed enterprise 
or state shareholding companies via its designated representatives, enjoys rights to 
share profits from assets, make major decisions and select managers in accordance 
with the scale of investment, bears limited responsibilities for enterprise debts, and 
will not interfere in the daily operations of enterprises. . . . In terms of personal and 
financial management, party and government departments at different levels should 
fully separate themselves from the economic entities they run or enterprises they 
directly administer. 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 17, 2006, Internet 
Edition. 
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depoliticization. Article 14 codifies a continuing supervision of 
enterprises by the government and social masses.32 Inevitably, this 
claim is in conflict with the intended enterprise independence. More 
serious deficits of the official depoliticization strategy result from the 
continuing influence of the “three old political committees”—party 
committee, labor committee, and trade union—placed within the 
firm. Although these “old committees” lose a large amount of their 
inherited coordination and control rights to the newly established 
positions—CEO, shareholder, board of directors, and supervisory 
committee—their survival invites a continuation of political 
involvement within firm decisions. Particularly, their long tradition as 
central political bodies within the firm provides fertile grounds for 
continuing informal involvement.33  
Vague legal specifications facilitate political interference. Local 
party committees are supposed to exert their activities in accordance 
with the constitution of the CCP.34 Article 31 of the CCP 
Constitution, in turn, broadly delegates the implementation of Party 
decisions to the local Party committees.35 Further specifications of 
tasks and duties are not made. The lack of precise legal specifications 
seems to reflect the central government’s reluctance to respond to the 
economic necessity of building a new system of modern corporate 
governance, for fear of losing support from the political committees 
at the grassroots level.36 Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin even 
suggested broad responsibilities for the Party, saying it should (1) 
remain in charge of the overall implementation of the Party line at the 
firm level, (2) fulfill tasks related to production and management, (3) 
take part in important business decisions, and (4) assist and support 
the board of directors, the supervisory committee and management.37 
 
 32. Company Law (1994), art. 14 (P.R.C.). 
 33. Shukun Wu & Yumin Du, Jiyu jiankong zhuti de gongsi zhili moshi tantao, 9 
ZHONGGUO GONGYE JINGJI 64, 68 (1998).  
 34. Company Law, art. 19 (2005) (P.R.C.). 
 35. CCP CONSTITUTION, art. 31 (P.R.C.). 
 36. In accordance with this line of thought, Wu Bangguo (1997), member of the CPC 
Central Committee and a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee since 1992, 
warned that the “Party must absolutely not lose its political leadership powers with regard to the 
enterprises,” and claimed that the “Party should take part in the decision-making in the 
enterprise with regard to major issues.” 
 37. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), CHI-1999-0817, 9. 
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Close overlap among these recommendations and specifications on 
the Party’s role in traditional SOEs, as codified in Article 32 of 
China’s Constitution, reinforces the state’s interest to maintain its 
control and right to participate even under the new corporate 
organization.  
B. Shareholder Protection  
While the specific legal rights of the party committees may not yet 
seem threatening, party control is reinforced through strong state 
ownership within the firms. With more than 80% of China’s listed 
firms being state-controlled, the Chinese market displays one of the 
highest levels of state ownership globally.38 In the Global Fortune 
500 ranking from 2007, a list published annually by Fortune 
Magazine that ranks companies according to size, all 22 companies 
from mainland China that made it onto the list are state-owned.39 
Within such a state-controlled ownership structure, private 
shareholders have virtually no “voice” when it comes to crucial 
company decisions such as the selection of CEOs, and nomination of 
members for the supervisory board. In essence, the state is the largest 
shareholder and its administrative representatives can make 
recruitment decisions independent of all other shareholders. The 
resulting dependence typically guarantees close cooperation and 
communication ties between management, supervisors, and state 
representatives.40  
Limitations on individual shareholder rights further weaken 
shareholder protection, and increase the relative power of state-
dominated insider networks. The Anti-Director Index covering a set 
of seven predefined dimensions of shareholder rights provides a 
convenient tool to proxy the extent of formal shareholder 
protection.41 While the underlying assumption that “good” legal 
provisions do not depend on contextual local features is surely 
 
 38. Martin Hovey and Tony Naughton, A Survey of Enterprise Reforms in China: The 
Way Forward, 31 ECON. SYS. 146 (2007). 
 39. Fortune Global 500, FORTUNE, July 23, 2007, available at http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/global500/2007/. 
 40. See TAM, supra note 29; CPI 2007, supra note 29. 
 41. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). 
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contestable, the Index provides an informative measure on the 
direction of legal change and on the extent of intended shareholder 
rights protection according to the law.42 China’s Company Law 
grants only three out of seven shareholder rights covered by the 
Index. First, the law guarantees one vote for each share. Second, the 
law provides legal mechanisms against perceived oppression by 
directors. Finally, the percentage of share capital needed to call an 
extraordinary shareholders meeting, is only 10%; quite low in 
international comparison.43 However, it is notable that the 10% 
benchmark is easily reached by a single “legal person” or state 
shareholder, while the highly dispersed ownership shares of private 
shareholders make non-state initiatives to call shareholder meetings 
highly unlikely. The remaining shareholder rights covered by the 
index are not granted.44  
A 2001 Supreme Court decision emphasized the oppression of 
minority shareholder rights vis-à-vis the state-dominated firms listed 
on China’s stock markets.45 First, the decision restricted lawsuits 
against a listed company to those cases where companies lied in their 
information disclosure. Market rigging and insider trading were 
excluded as causes of action.46 Second, courts could only take up 
civil cases if the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
already confirmed incidents of financial fraud.47 Though the CSRC is 
formally legally independent, it is not sufficiently shielded from 
political pressure exerted by party and government, who possess not 
only regulatory, but also ownership interests of firms. In this sense, 
the government has a vital interest to control the total amount of 
pending lawsuits, as these feed back on the resulting investment 
climate at the stock exchanges. The power of market supervision is 
thus concentrated in the hands of the government and its regulatory 
 
 42. Pistor et al., supra note 3. 
 43. Company Law (1994), art. 104(3) (P.R.C.). 
 44. These are the availability of proxy by mail, cumulative voting and the rule to not 
block shares from trading before shareholding meetings.  
 45. See www.p5w.net: CSRC Unhappy with Court Rulings on Losses, Nov. 2, 2001, and 
“Cases Against Stock Fraud Suspended”, CHINA DAILY (Internet Edition), Sept. 27, 2001.  
 46. See New Rules Backs Small Investors, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 16, 2002. 
 47. Id.  
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bodies, while individual shareholders enjoy only limited independent 
means to control and sanction financial malfeasance.  
Sluggish market development eventually led to three further 
amendments of the Company Law, which gradually increased 
shareholder rights. The last amendment, which became effective in 
2006, now provides a legal basis for minority actions against 
controlling shareholders and fraudulent managers.48 If, for example, 
directors and senior management personnel breach their duties or the 
company’s articles of association, and thereby harm the interests of 
shareholders, a shareholder now has the formal right to sue them 
directly in court.  
To sum up, the internal organizational structure and the extent and 
specification of shareholder rights originally formulated in China’s 
first Company Law—while modeled closely on Western models—
reflects, in crucial areas, the government’s intent to establish a 
corporate governance system which combines state control and 
leeway for direct state intervention with limited protection of private 
shareholder rights.  
II. LEGAL ENFORCEMENT 
In addition to the politicized vertical command structure and weak 
shareholders protection, ineffective law enforcement further 
undermines the position of minority shareholders in China. To begin 
with, China’s legal history differs markedly from the civil and 
common law traditions, as civil order was mainly based on family 
and local community arbitration. Chinese law was essentially limited 
to criminal law. The concept of subjective rights, in contrast, has only 
a short history. It was imported from the Western imperial powers no 
sooner than the nineteenth century, and treated with great reluctance 
by the Communists until the beginning of economic reforms in 1978. 
Since then, China has forcefully sped up its legal reforms, but with 
two clear limitations. 
To start, China shares problems typical of other developing and 
transition economies, such as insufficient financial resources and a 
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scarcity of well-trained human capital.49 Most pronounced is a severe 
shortage of legal professionals. In China’s pre-reform period, there 
was nearly no legal recourse, or legal system in place, for private 
citizens seeking to address injustices or grievances. It is estimated 
that only one-fifth of all lawyers have formally studied law at an 
institution of higher education; the fraction of university trained 
judges is assumed to be even lower.50 Thus, the problem is more 
pronounced among judges than lawyers. Judges enjoy low social 
status and are poorly paid, which makes them particularly vulnerable 
to corruption.51 In spite of widely publicized efforts to clamp down 
on bribery, nepotism, and other abuses of power, corruption remains 
widespread and even seems to be rising again. According to the 
World Bank Governance Indicators, control of corruption has 
actually decreased continuously since 1996.52 
More importantly, the legal system did not change in one crucial 
aspect: it is still anything but independent from the Party.53 Local 
courts are restricted to a subordinate position in relation to the local 
party committees54 with court officers being “hired, paid and 
promoted” and budgets provided by local government officials.55 
This invites political guidance and frequently skews court judgments 
against outsiders. Foreign shareholders, for instance, are typically in a 
weak position to sue their local partners. Local shareholders can 
exploit personal connections, which frequently leads to the judge’s 
 
 49. John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public 
Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421 (2000). 
 50. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in 
China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (2005). 
 51. Survey, Of Laws and Men, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2001, at 16; Jerome Alan Cohen, 
China’s Legal Reform at the Crossroads, 169 FAR E. ECON. REV. 23, 24–25. 
 52. World Bank. 2007. Governance Matters 2007. Worldwide Governance Indicators 
1996–2006. http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp. In the latest 
Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International, China ranked 72th 
among a total of 179 countries, with a score of 3.5 on a scale of 1-10 (with 10 indicating ‘highly 
clean’ and zero indicating ‘highly corrupt). CPI 2007, supra note 29. 
 53. Tian Zhu, China’s Corporatization Drive: An Evaluation and Policy Implications, 17 
CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 530, 530–39 (1999). 
 54. SHIPING ZHENG, PARTY VS. STATE IN POST-1949 CHINA (1997); Mark Findlay, 
Independence and the Judiciary in the PRC: Expectation for Constitutional Legality in China, 
in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA, 281–99 (K. Jayasuriya ed., 1999). 
 55. Cohen, supra note 51, at 25. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/11
p 245 Opper Schwaag Serger book pages.doc 7/22/2008 11:29:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Corporate Governance in China 259 
 
 
decision to dismiss the case or to delay a lawsuit.56 Similar problems 
apply to other individuals from outside a local context, as well as 
local people who do not belong to, or question, the network of 
political and local government interests. Lawsuits involving state 
interests are usually handled in line with political priorities such as 
local employment levels and welfare conditions. The threat of social 
instability, for instance, can have a decisive impact on court rulings.57 
Conflicts between individual and public interests are particularly 
common when it comes to the protection of minority shareholder 
rights. The government defends its interests as a holder of state shares 
in distinct companies, but also has a general interest to secure an 
overall positive atmosphere towards security investments. State 
officials therefore seek to limit any tendencies that could trigger a 
general loss of trust in security investments. Clarke notes that the 
Supreme People’s Court has actually set certain limits on the number 
of cases local courts are allowed to hear on securities-related 
claims.58 Legal justice and unbiased law enforcement is therefore not 
to be expected, as long as the state remains involved as a regulatory 
authority while maintaining political monopoly power and asserting 
strong economic interests as the dominant holder of industrial assets. 
But even if lawsuits are accepted, failure to enforce legal judgments 
is a common feature of China’s judicial system. According to recent 
estimations, only 60% of court rulings are actually enforced, with 
much lower averages in the less developed hinterland.59  
This, however, is not to say that overall legality is receding. 
Instead, legality varies depending on whose interests are affected and 
particularly on whether disputes are between private parties or 
whether they involve a clash between private and state interests. 
Written contracts, for instance, are the basis of most business 
operations. The World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey conducted 
in the years 2000 and 2002 confirms that, overall, 89% of firms enter 
into written contracts with their clients. The use of written contracts, 
 
 56. Of Laws and Men, supra note 51, at 16–17. 
 57. Susan V. Lawrence, Shareholder Lawsuits: Ally of the People, 165 FAR E. ECON. 
REV. 26 (2002). 
 58. See Clarke, supra note 22, at 503. 
 59. Business: Winning is Only Half the Battle: China’s Courts, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 
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however, varies across different legal company forms. Contracts are 
less pronounced among the traditional public firms—state-owned 
firms (86%) and collectively owned firms (84%)—but they are more 
common among incorporated state-holding firms (97%) and listed 
companies (92%).60  
In spite of strong reliance on contractual agreements in private 
business relations, the individual perception of legal protection 
remains rather unsteady, and is most insecure when private interest 
collides with state interests. The overall predictability of the judicial 
system remains low. Respondents of the same survey indicate that the 
predictability of the judicial system reaches on average only 17% 
(with values ranging from zero for no predictability to 100, in cases 
of absolute predictability).61 Unsurprisingly, when polled, state-
holdings, firms generally perceived to be at the center of the state’s 
interest and which are deeply embedded in high-level political 
networks, perceive judicial predictability to be much higher, 
averaging 36%.62 A cross-industry comparison of judicial 
predictability reveals an even wider spread. Highest scores are 
observed in key industrial sectors with strong government 
involvement, such as biotechnology (33%), chemical products (34%), 
and transportation equipment (26%); while the mainly privately 
organized sector for consumer products shows a low of only 4%.63 A 
firm’s perception of the predictability, reliability, and fairness of 
legal protection in China, thus, seems closely related to its relative 
proximity to or distance from political and governmental networks.  
III. THE ROLE OF INFORMAL NORMS  
One of the general lessons from this is that institutional reforms 
require a “goodness of fit” between the specific innovation and the 
country’s broader institutional environment, including its norms and 
beliefs.64 Many of the different attempts to institute capitalism by 
 
 60. WORLD BANK, INVESTMENT CLIMATE SURVEY: CHINA (2003), http://iresearch. 
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 63. Id. 
 64. Brian Levy & Pablo T. Spiller, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/11
p 245 Opper Schwaag Serger book pages.doc 7/22/2008 11:29:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Corporate Governance in China 261 
 
 
design ignored “the persistence of routines and practices, 
organizational forms and social ties that can become assets, 
resources, and the basis for credible commitments and coordinated 
actions in the post-socialist period.”65 This applies profoundly to the 
case of corporate governance, where mixed and often conflicting 
stakeholder interests contribute to structural and organizational 
inertia. Persisting behavioral patterns slow down the implementation 
of new organizational structures and the reorganization of internal 
command structures. The effect of two social norms will help 
illustrate the case.  
A. The Norm of Political Control 
While formal rules specified in the Company Law have 
transferred control rights from the old socialist committees to the new 
company representatives of CEO and board of directors, members of 
the old elite benefited from the established power structure that 
allowed them to occupy key positions in the firm. Actual party and 
government representation within the firm, therefore, is far more 
pronounced than could be inferred from the formal specifications 
regarding party activities within the firm.  
The preservation of the party’s monopoly supports the strong role 
of the party within the firm. Uncontested power at the macro-level 
easily triggers a “voluntary” acceptance or even the request for 
political involvement at the firm level, as long as the enterprise 
decision-making elite believes that cooperation will yield positive 
economic returns either for the insiders or for the firm. Survey data 
confirms a high representation of party members and officeholders in 
leading firm positions.66  
According to the World Bank Investment Climate Survey in 2003, 
67% of CEOs in 2351 surveyed firms were party members.67 Forty-
two percent of the interviewed CEOs even played an active political 
 
Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, 10 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 201, 202–03, 242 (1994). 
 65. David Stark, Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism, 101 AM. J. SOC. 
993, 995 (1996). 
 66. See WORLD BANK, supra note 60, all raw data. 
 67. Id.  
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role as party secretaries, deputy party secretaries, or party committee 
members.68 The respective distribution in China’s large-scale stock 
listed firms is even higher. Eighty-four percent of the interviewed 
CEOs were party members, and 55% held a party position.69 Close 
party-firm relations are reinforced by the government’s involvement 
in recruitment decisions. Seventeen percent of firms report that the 
CEO was not—as legally required—appointed by the Board of 
Directors, but directly recruited by the responsible government 
authorities. Evidently, the new governance structure of China’s large-
scale business sector is still heavily controlled by party and 
government elites, which almost necessarily implies a neglect of non-
state owner interests.  
B. The Norm of Authoritarian Leadership 
The implementation of new organizational structures and 
hierarchies is clearly at variance with the established power structure 
and authoritarian leadership style factory directors are accustomed to. 
This has triggered a de-coupling of the formal and factual authority 
division within the firm, which weakened the effectiveness of formal 
board representation by independent directors. Though both 
Company Law and regulatory stipulations call for the inclusion of 
independent actors on the board of directors and the supervisory 
board to fight insider control and management malfeasance, the 
general social norm is that independent directors are not expected to 
“actively” perform their formal duties.70 Good independent directors 
are actually those who do not interfere and contest insider decisions. 
Most importantly, there is a common practice that independent 
directors are recommended by the CEOs and appointed by the state, 
which weakens their ability to monitor management decisions 
independently. Instead, they provide assistance to the manager rather 
than any form of independent supervision.71 Board decisions thus 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Stipulations call for one-third of the board members to be independent directors. 
 71. Dana R. Hermanson, What I Learned About Governance from the Chinese 
Delegations, INTERNAL AUDITING, May/June 2003, at 44, 44–45. 
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remain strongly dominated by key players.72 Such ceremonial formal 
structures mainly serve to satisfy requirements of external 
constituents, while the informal norm of power concentration 
continues to guide daily operations.73  
The norm of authoritarian leadership also has led to a 
concentration of several functions in one person, causing so-called 
CEO-duality. The most common example is for one person to be 
chairman or vice-chairman of the board, CEO, and CCP 
representative at the same time. By combining the strategic and 
operative powers in one person, the board of directors no longer 
serves as an independent internal control mechanism. Operational 
and strategic decisions are merged, and there is neither effective 
monitoring of the management decisions, nor supervision of the 
implementation of these decisions. Equally important, party interests 
are naturally reflected in management and board decisions due to the 
strong representation of political interests among the firm’s decision 
makers. As a result, shareholders’ interests are not safeguarded, and 
the absence of control and corrective mechanisms increases the 
probability of power abuse and opportunism. The problem is 
aggravated by the fact that very few company boards have 
established steering groups for different operational divisions which 
serve the important function of increasing executive and managerial 
efficiency.74  
One explanation for concentration of power is the failure to 
clearly appoint tasks and responsibilities to individuals, which itself 
stems from a desire to avoid conflicts. The striving to establish 
formal control structures within a company has thus led to a fusion of 
western-style organizational structures with authoritarian-style 
concentration of power.  
 
 72. China’s Securities Regulator Cracks Down on Murky Practices, ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 
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IV. COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS 
Institutional change of corporate governance is not limited to 
internal organizational governance as specified by the Company Law. 
Equally important are complementary institutions of external 
governance which shape incentives and constraints at the firm level.75 
If such external mechanisms are missing, deficits of internal 
governance are reinforced, and the effectiveness of distinct tools is 
undermined. The efficiency-increasing effects of performance-related 
management compensation, such as executive stock options, rest on 
the efficiency of stock markets. In the presence of illiquid and easy to 
manipulate markets, stock options do not necessarily lead to 
improved firm performance, but may simply invite price-
manipulation and management self-dealings.  
The Chinese discourse on corporate governance has long 
neglected the systemic character of Western corporate governance 
and focused one-sidedly on internal organizational issues, agency 
problems and the state’s position vis-à-vis the reformed state-owned 
sector. The underlying notion has been that the modernization of 
internal control structures and the inclusion of private shareholders 
would create sufficient incentives to promote enterprise growth and 
profitability. External incentives shaping and guiding firm behavior 
have hardly been covered in the corporate governance debate. The 
narrow definition of corporate governance may reflect the 
government’s longstanding position that weak performance of firms 
is mainly caused by weak management and organizational 
deficiencies. In contrast, the incentive role of markets has been 
widely neglected. While China’s leadership promoted product market 
competition already at an early stage of reforms, a skeptical view of 
the free working of the market mechanism persisted in areas such as 
financial markets, markets for land-use rights and various monopoly 
sectors. As a result, external governance of China’s listed firms 
remains limited. 
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Because of distinct ownership distribution and the existence of 
segmented markets, China effectively has no active take-over market. 
Furthermore, external financial controls of the state-dominated 
banking system remain ineffective. Thus, while the Commercial 
Bank Law, effective in 1995, guaranteed the formal-legal 
independence of commercial banks, it nonetheless stated that loan 
decisions should be taken under the “guidance of state economic 
policies.”76 Empirical evidence indicates that local governments can 
easily intervene in loan decisions.77 Even the stock listing of China’s 
state commercial banks in 2007 is unlikely to bring about the 
urgently needed depoliticization of the credit market since the 
government remains the controlling shareholder in all corporatized 
state banks. Continued politicized lending, frequent debt 
rescheduling, and high default rates of borrowers confirm that the 
capital market cannot yet provide effective external controls. 
In addition, protection of creditor rights remains weak. Insolvency 
and bankruptcy procedures offer wide leeway for government 
intervention, which limits the credibility of firm liquidation as the 
ultimate sanctioning mechanism.78 The Supreme Court further 
complicated bankruptcy procedures when it advised the People’s 
Courts to apply mixed standards that include not only consideration 
of creditor rights, but also general economic goals such as the 
modernization of the local industrial structure and maintenance of 
social security.79 Even if the court agrees to liquidate a firm, creditors 
enjoy only weak protection, as liquidation teams are typically made 
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up of shareholders, government agencies and professionals.80 
Creditors themselves are not represented,81 which naturally reduces 
their chance to secure at least part of the granted loan.  
The market for managers, another external mechanism for 
sanctioning management malfeasance, does not exert effective 
corrective pressure. Although management turnover in China’s 
corporations has been increasing continuously, and most recent 
studies confirm that chairman turnover is related to a firm’s 
profitability, the material consequences for managers are quite 
limited.82 Thanks to China’s dire market for qualified managerial 
personnel, reemployment, often accompanied by substantial salary 
increases, is almost guaranteed. This is in line with evidence 
suggesting that companies rarely improve their performance after a 
management turnover.83 Hence, the market does not yet provide the 
pool of managers which would allow a better “fit” with company 
profile and required experience and skills. This is also partly the 
result of the politicized recruitment process that still favors politically 
well connected candidates.  
Finally, the weak status of the financial information industry is 
worth mentioning. The government maintains state control and 
censorship over information.84 Even foreign press agencies have been 
placed under the supervision of the Chinese news agency, Xinhua. 
Among the more recent attempts to control information has been 
China’s ban on newspapers to reprint stories from online sources 
without censorship.85 Though there are examples of newspapers 
uncovering and publishing irregularities, newspapers still depend on 
political goodwill for their survival and thus have to accept close 
supervision.86 Detection of financial scandals, such as accounting 
 
 80. See Zhu, supra note 53, at 538. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Michael Firth et al., Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top 
Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1289 (2006). 
 84. According to Freedom House, China ranks 181 of 195 countries ranked, with 
comparable levels of unfree press with countries such as Syria, Iran, and Rwanda. See 
www.freedomhouse.org.  
 85. China Online, U.S.-based News Service, http://www.chinaonline.com. Feb. 27, 2001. 
 86. One example was when financial newspapers such as Caijing contributed to the 
revelation of insider trading and accounting fraud of listed companies. 
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fraud, violation of shareholder rights, and insider trading, are only 
publicized as long as the “healthy” development of the securities 
market and overall stability are not affected. The guiding principle is 
therefore, that reports should not exceed a critical level. The role of 
the emerging financial press is therefore limited to the detection of 
isolated cases of management malfeasance; revelation of systematic 
problems that permeate the whole financial system and could 
seriously weaken investor confidence is less likely.  
In summary, China’s strategy of corporate governance reforms is 
best described as a selective approach, which focuses on the import 
and adaptation of isolated institutional elements without introducing 
the necessary complementary institutions. Particularly, market-based 
external governance mechanisms remain weak. However, the 
separation of ownership and control,87 with its inherent information 
asymmetries and monitoring problems, builds on the existence and 
effective operation of external market mechanisms.  
CONCLUSION 
Since its economic opening, China has impressed with its rapid 
pace of legal reforms in fields such as Company and Securities Law. 
As one observer remarked, “no nation has ever produced 
legislation—substantive, organizational, procedural—as the People’s 
Republic has in the last quarter of a century.”88 However, while many 
laws are in place, their effectiveness in ensuring good corporate 
governance is low. This ineffectiveness, we argue, is best understood 
with an encompassing institutional approach, which goes beyond 
distinct “norms” to understand laws as but one element of relevant 
institutional complexes. While normative, often comparative, 
perspectives may provide useful tools for legal analysis across 
countries with comparable standards of legal independence and 
similar social belief systems, an isolated focus on legal regulations is 
of little value for most transition and developing economies. Some of 
the initially celebrated laws and regulations have turned out to be 
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ineffective, while laws described as ill-defined from a Western 
perspective seem to lower transaction costs by a significant margin.  
Our cursory analysis demonstrates that a focus on formal norms 
would inadequately capture the directions and qualities of legal 
change. The case of China’s emerging corporate governance system 
illustrates the complexities of legal change, which call for an 
institutional approach covering the distinct elements that jointly 
shape and constrain human behavior. The political economy of law 
reforms has illustrated that China’s Company Law and Security Law 
reflect the prevailing power balance and persistence of socialist and 
anti-market sentiments. Complementary institutions and persisting 
informal norms weaken the limited power of independent 
shareholders and stakeholders. The de facto system of corporate 
governance is thereby further removed from the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance than a narrow legal comparison 
would suggest. Low profitability, insider control, and low dividend 
payments, among other things, support our analysis that there are not 
yet reliable control mechanisms in place to sanction management 
malfeasance and thus address weak performance.89 
On the theoretical side, institutional analysis, which places 
changes of legal norms in the broader institutional context and 
explicitly incorporates the interplay between formal and informal 
norms, provides an untapped opportunity to test standard institutional 
knowledge in different institutional environments. While it is widely 
accepted that formal and informal norms jointly shape social 
behavior, there is still very little analysis that aids in understanding 
how formal and informal norms “combine to shape the performance 
of organizations and economies.”90 Without further research on the 
interaction and combined effects of distinct institutional elements, 
analysis of legal change will continue to suffer from indeterminacy. It 
is the transfer of distinct formal norms into different institutional 
settings that helps tease out the interplay and relevance of contextual 
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Fan et al., Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of 
China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 330–57. 
 90. Nee, supra note 9. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/11
p 245 Opper Schwaag Serger book pages.doc 7/22/2008 11:29:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Corporate Governance in China 269 
 
 
factors. While institutional theory typically assumes the existence of 
mature markets and independent and impartial judicial systems 
guaranteeing the implementation of de jure rights,91 none of these 
preconditions are fulfilled in transition economies. Research on 
institutional change in transition economies provides a new and still 
underutilized opportunity to gain deeper insights into determinants 
and directions of institutional change. Transition economies contain 
strong institutional variations offering valuable data sets to 
investigate the way institutions develop, the existence of institutional 
complements and substitutes, and the interplay between formal and 
informal institutions, such as social norms and private ordering. 
Cross-country comparisons, and also observations over time, may 
give important insights on how institutional elements combine to 
constrain and motivate human behavior. For instance, under which 
conditions are new formal norms implemented? When do informal 
norms have a lasting and modifying impact on newly instituted 
norms? Institutional analysis of legal change not only provides a 
more accurate tool to grasp the quality and direction of legal change, 
it also promises new theoretical insights, which may advance current 
research programs seeking to better understand the combined effect 
of formal and informal norms.92 
 
 91. DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
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(1993). 
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